FA-50: The Low-Cost Alternative to Western Fighter Aircraft

With its sale to the Philippines, Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) FA-50 fighter jet may be the answer for countries that cannot afford expensive western aircraft.

South Korea will provide the Philippines with 12 FA-50 jets worth $415.7 million. Priced at $35 million a jet, the FA-50 presumably costs lower than the JAS 39 Gripen besides lower operating cost than Swedish aircraft

Litening is a combat-proven multi-spectral airborne targeting and navigation pod.  It is designed for navigation and target illumination to improve day and night attack capabilities.  Litening presents pilots with real-time, Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) and Charge Coupled Device (CCD) imagery.  The high sensor resolution enables pilots to reliably identify the combat objects and consequently to avoid collateral damage.  It is fully operational 24 hours a day and in adverse weather conditions.

The aircraft is equipped with Joint Direct Attack Munition, the Sensor-Fused Weapon and the AGM-65 Maverick. According to KAI, the FA-50 could eventually add the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser and a host of Israeli munitions equipped with the Rafael Spice electro-optical/infrared/GPS/inertial guidance kit. It would also be able to carry the Rafael Litening II targeting pod. It is not known what weapons configuration will go with the Philippines order.

In December 2013, the Iraqi Air Force signed a $1.1 billion contract for 24 T-50 aircraft, which is the most advanced version of the FA-50, and will be able to serve both as an advanced jet trainer and light attack aircraft.

Missiles for MPACs

A gunboat with Spike-ER installed

The Philippines will buy additional sea vessels worth P270 million to improve territorial protection operations, an official said Saturday.

The Spike-ER Anti Tank Guided Weapon (ATGW) is the extended long-range version of the Spike family, capable of defeating tanks at a range of up to 8 kilometers. This missile is designed for installation on land vehicles, helicopters and naval platforms. Spike-ER uses a day seeker or day/night seeker, tandem warhead, and retains the dual operation modes of Spike- Fire-and-Forget & Fire-Observe and Update.

In a statement, Department of National Defense (DND) Undersecretary Fernando Manalo said they are already accepting bidders for the acquisition of three more Multi-Purpose Attack Craft (MPAC) which has the ability to launch missiles.

“The winning bidder must be able to deliver the MPAC within 540 calendar days from the opening of the letter of credit,” said Manalo, chairman of the DND special bids and awards committee.

Sadral Missile System mounted on a Navy vessel...

Once the sea crafts are delivered, another separate contract will be given to the supplier for the missile launch system and remote weapon installation.

The Philippine Navy is currently utilizing its two sea war vessels, the BRP Ramon Alcaraz and BRP Gregorio del Pilar, and three peacock-class gun boats in patrolling and protecting areas, including the disputed West Philippine Sea.

Chinese Coast Guard Used Water Cannons Against Filipino Fishermen

Using water cannons, Chinese coast guard vessels tried to drive away Filipino fishermen from the disputed Scarborough Shoal last month, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Emmanuel Bautista said Monday.

Chinese Coast Guard Vessel Patrolling the West Philippine Sea 

The Philippines would respond militarily if China uses force to drive away Filipinos fishing in waters around a disputed island in the South China Sea.

Gen. Bautista issued this warning as a response to reports that ships from China's Coast Guard drove away Filipinos fishing in areas around Scarborough Shoal using water cannons on Jan 27.

"We have to react militarily if force is applied," he said at an event organised by the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines.

When asked about the situation around Scarborough Shoal, Gen Bautista said it is Manila's policy to avoid a confrontation with Chinese vessels patrolling the South China Sea.

But he stressed that it is the AFP's duty to defend Filipinos when they are subjected to "armed violence" within Philippine territories.

General Emmanuel Bautista, chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the United States' ambassador to the Philippines Philip Goldberg at a forum on Feb 24 organised by the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines. Gen Bautista and Mr Goldberg are urging Beijing to return to a United Nations arbitration process to settle disputes over the South China Sea.

China claims almost all of the South China Sea but the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan have overlapping claims.

Tensions between the Philippines and China have risen in recent years as Beijing becomes more aggressive in asserting its claims.

Last month, China also announced a new fisheries law that requires foreign vessels to seek permits for activities in much of the South China Sea, in another move that triggered angry protests from Manila.

Waves of Expectation: Naval Cooperation in Southeast Asia

A combined US Navy and Republic of Singapore Navy task group steams together in the South China Sea in 2004, during Exercise Co-operation Afloat Readiness and Training ('CARAT'). (United States Navy)

 Despite ASEAN's claims to be a developing regional security community, there is less to naval cooperation in Southeast Asia than meets the eye. Dr Euan Graham and Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto discuss...

As tensions in the South China Sea have mounted in recent years, Southeast Asia has been viewed more as a theatre for strategic rivalry, political disunity, and competition in naval capability acquisition than as a focal point for maritime co-operation. When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN's) 10 foreign ministers (representing the member states Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) failed - for the first time in the grouping's 45-year history - to agree on a joint communiqué at the July 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Phnom Penh, the South China Sea was seen to be the issue dividing them. In particular, Cambodia had refused to support the Philippines in its territorial dispute with China.

Against this backdrop, as well as longer-running critiques of ASEAN's institutional weaknesses, it is easy to lose sight of successes in naval co-operation that have occurred across Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, instances where regional navies work with each other owe more to bilateral and localized sub-regional arrangements, like the quadripartite Malacca Straits Patrols, than they do to top-down ASEAN initiatives. This limitation fundamentally reflects the continuing primacy of state interests over supranational co-operation in the region.

Maritime Geography

Southeast Asia's prevailing geography is markedly maritime, despite the existence of land borders with India and China. The sea forms an important and integral component of the national profiles of regional states. For two of the world's largest archipelagic nations, Indonesia and the Philippines, the sea is a matter of national identity and is seen as essential to national cohesion. Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam depend heavily on the sea for economic development, while for Singapore freedom of navigation is an existential issue. Although less maritime-based, Myanmar, Cambodia, and even land-locked Laos rely on the sea for national income.

A line-up of Formidable-class frigates of the Republic of Singapore Navy. Singapore is one of a small number of Southeast Asian navies able to maintain a level of sophistication in maritime surveillance and war-fighting capability. (DCNS)

Although Timor Leste is not a member of ASEAN, it is certainly part of Southeast Asia's maritime security complex. The cone-shaped geography of Timor Leste flanks two important maritime areas: the Ombai-Wetar Strait to the north; and the energy-rich Timor Sea to the south. Compounding this is Southeast Asia's central location and connecting function in the wider Indo-Pacific macro region, including the choke-point straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok-Makassar, and Ombai-Wetar as well as the semi-enclosed South China Sea itself. As trade and other interactions within the Indo-Pacific region grow, the importance of Southeast Asia as a maritime crossroads will naturally increase. In this context, the maritime domain will be strategically predominant. 

Accordingly, Southeast Asia's security environment is notable for the large number of transnational issues that demand co-operation and collective action across borders and boundaries. Many of these issues have a maritime or riverine dimension, such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.


Patrols and Exercises

Members of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency's (MMEA's) Special Task and Rescue team carry out a boarding exercise. Malaysia has handed over responsibility for law enforcement within its 12 n mile territorial sea and 200 n mile Exclusive Economic Zone to the MMEA. (Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency)

Coordinated patrols and combined exercises are the predominant type of naval co-operation in Southeast Asia, of which the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) is the most important example. Started in 2005, the MSP was initially a three-way initiative to co-ordinate counter-piracy patrols between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, whose territorial waters overlap across large sections of the Malacca and Singapore Straits. As well as 'grey-hulled' naval vessels, 'white-hulled' non-military vessels participate: Malaysia for example has largely handed over responsibility for law enforcement, including counter-piracy, within its 12 n mile territorial sea and 200 n mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency. Coordinated patrols are different from combined patrols, however. The 'coordinated' arrangement assuages concerns over breaches of sovereignty as patrolling vessels are allowed only to operate within their national maritime boundaries, save for the aerial 'eyes in the sky' component which admitted Thailand as the fourth participant in 2008. The MSP concept has played a part in reducing piracy incidents in the straits from their last serious spike in 2004, when 38 actual or attempted attacks took place, compared with 13 occurrences in 2012, none of which fell into the most serious categories.

However, political limitations have constrained the operational effectiveness of the MSP, since hot pursuit arrangements are only partially in place. In reality, and true to the adage that piracy is best tackled on land, the coordinated patrols have been effective mainly in the indirect sense of providing a deterrent presence. Cases of pirates and robbers being apprehended red-handed during actual patrols are exceedingly rare.

It can be argued that the success story of the MSP owes its existence indirectly to the surge in interest in maritime security in the Malacca Straits expressed by outside powers around 2004. Without such external pressure, fed by the perception that the United States was contemplating taking a hands-on role in securing the straits, it is doubtful whether Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore would have co-operated in the manner that they did. Indonesia and Malaysia have long espoused that the littoral states should have exclusive responsibility for security for the portion of the straits that falls within their territorial waters - notwithstanding the international transit passage regime and traffic separation schemes that regulate shipping passing through.

Beyond the MSP, coordinated patrols such as the Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrol, Malaysia-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (Patkor Malindo), and the Malaysia-Philippines maritime patrols are conducted bilaterally along common maritime boundaries. In the Gulf of Tonkin, Vietnam and China have conducted naval patrols together since 2005, a notable success juxtaposed against the tensions and incidents that have marred their relations in the South China Sea proper. These patrols, conducted twice a year, are combined, multinational activities to the extent that warships may venture up to 5 km either side of the maritime boundary. However, such co-operation is made possible only by the existence of an agreed maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin. Elsewhere in the region overlapping maritime boundaries and territorial disputes continue to constrain naval co-operation, and not just in the South China Sea.

Vietnam has also been notably active in pushing forward direct communication links and coordinated patrol initiatives with several ASEAN partners, including Malaysia and Cambodia. More recently, Vietnam has built two-way communications links with Brunei, and prospectively Indonesia is next on the list. This kind of organic bilateral - or 'cross-bracing' - engagement among Southeast Asian nations may be more sustainable than the ASEAN-led top-down approach.

Alongside coordinated patrols are combined, multinational exercises established to improve professionalism, inter-operability, and co-operation as well as to develop exchange experience and draw lessons from fellow navies. These exercises include the Indonesia-Singapore 'MINEX' mine countermeasures activity, conducted since 1997; the Malaysia-Singapore 'Malapura' exercise, established in 1984; and the Malaysia-Thailand 'Thalay Laut' bilateral naval exercise.

Malaysian ship KD Jebat (front) and Indonesian ship KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda anchored in Jervis Bay, Australia during the first ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)-Plus maritime security exercise in October 2013. The exercise, intended to promote information sharing and communication at sea, involved force elements from Australia, Brunei, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. (Royal Australian Navy)

Information Sharing and Dialogue

Maritime information sharing and naval dialogues constitute a second type of regional naval co-operation. Information sharing can act as a force multiplier for regional navies, as well as for maritime law enforcement agencies, to enable them to respond individually or collectively to maritime security challenges.

A specific example of the benefits of information sharing is the Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP), launched in 2006. Its membership includes eight ASEAN members - with Indonesia and Malaysia not participating. The latter's refusal to participate in particular leaves a huge hole in regional maritime co-operation. Apart from covering much of Southeast Asia's maritime water-frontage, including the strategically important Malacca Strait, the involvement of both Indonesia and Malaysia is essential if continuing maritime security risks - as highlighted by a recent resurgence of incidents including petty theft and illegal fuel transfers in ports and anchorages - are to be addressed. Although there is some working-level collaboration between ReCAAP and Indonesia and Malaysia, their full participation would increase the effectiveness of ReCAAP's Singapore-hosted Information Sharing Centre, which operates on a 24/7 basis through a secure web-based information network system that links all ReCAAP national 'Focal Points' - the agency in each ReCAAP member state which acts as the primary point of contact with ReCAAP - to enable appropriate responses to incidents of maritime crime.

The Information Fusion Centre (IFC), located at Singapore's Changi Naval Base command-and-control centre, works on a similar arrangement but is more naval-centric. It brings together naval liaison officers from around 20 countries, including fellow ASEAN members. Set up in 2009, it represents a significant investment in regional co-ordination capacity. The direct link back to national headquarters brought by the resident liaison officers is an important part of its operational concept. Its 24-hour manning approach also gives it obvious potential to serve as a hub for maritime crisis response.

Linked to the IFC is the ASEAN Information-sharing Portal which facilitates real-time information exchange between various operational centres within ASEAN navies through a 'group chat' function. Coordinated by the Singaporean and Indonesian navies, the portal can be accessed through a personal computer at fixed operation centres, or via the mobile devices and smart phones of individual officers.

However, information sharing has its limits. Even sharing data on the common threat posed by piracy and armed robbery at sea can be problematic, given a culture-bound reluctance to share national datasets of incidents occurring within territorial waters, and the tendency to equate information with intelligence. Moreover, there are lingering concerns about the potential for leakage and misuse of sensitive information on vessel and cargo movements, particularly at local law enforcement levels. Formal mechanisms for information exchange, such as the Malacca Straits Patrols Information System, may be less reliable in practice than informal channels, which in turn are dependent on the strength of inter-personal connections, hence prone to dislocation when key personnel rotate elsewhere.


Capability Pooling

Notwithstanding such geopolitical concerns, ASEAN navies have aimed to test the limits of co-operation in previously unplumbed depths. Several Southeast Asian navies have recently entered into a limited form of capability-pooling in submarine search-and-rescue (SAR), arising out of concerns over the safety of submarine operations. IHS Jane's Navy International has projected that Southeast Asia is a growing submarine market, with 13 diesel-electric boats (SSKs) to be acquired between 2011 and 2020 at an estimated cost of USD4.7 billion.

Singapore recently signed a contract with ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems GmBH to acquire two new Type 218SG submarines, equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP), for delivery from 2020. The deal includes a training and logistics package, and also a combat system to be developed jointly with Singapore's ST Electronics. Acquired to replace the Challenger class, the Type 218SGs are Singapore's first new, custom-built submarines and will serve alongside the AIP-capable ex-Swedish Västergötland Archer-class boats.
More submarines also mean a higher chance of accidents, especially when they are deployed in the confined and narrow waters of Southeast Asia by navies with limited operational experience in such demanding environments.

A Type 209 Chang Bogo conventional submarine. In December 2012, Indonesia announced it would purchase three Chang Bogo boats from South Korea. (Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft)

Currently, Singapore has the region's only submarine rescue capability. Launched in 2008, the Submarine Support and Rescue Vessel, MV Swift Rescue , is designed to carry out rescue operations for distressed submarines in up to sea state 5. Swift Rescue embarks a Submarine Rescue Vehicle (SRV) that it transports to the location of the submarine and deploys to extract survivors. The SRV will then transport the rescued submariners to a Transfer Lock and Recompression Chamber for any medical treatment required. This was a clear opportunity for some level of capability pooling, given that the other ASEAN navies operating submarines - Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam - face three unpalatable alternatives: bearing the risk of continuing to operate submarines without SAR; acquiring their own submarine SAR vessels - which would be an expensive exercise in duplication, given the small numbers of platforms involved; or relying on extra-regional states that might not be able to respond as required in an emergency. Instead, Indonesia and Vietnam have opted to enter into bilateral agreements with Singapore, in 2012 and 2013 respectively, to extend submarine SAR coverage to them.


As Southeast Asia's longest continuous submarine operator, it is surprising that Indonesia lacks a submarine rescue capability. Jakarta plans to acquire up to 12 boats over the next two decades to replace and augment its submarine force, currently constructed around two Chakra-class Type 209 boats acquired from Germany in the 1980s. In December 2012, Indonesia announced it would purchase three Type 209 Chang Bogo submarines from South Korea for a cheaper price, despite initially preferring the more costly Russian Kilo or Amur classes. The latter types were re-offered by Moscow in August 2013, but their reported procurement cost of around USD5 billion fell beyond Jakarta's naval budget.

Considering its limited financial means, Jakarta's ambitious submarine plans appear genuine, as a submarine base is already under construction in the city of Palu on Sulawesi Island. Critically, Indonesia has also managed to preserve a functioning submarine arm to serve as a nucleus from which to expand. However, without reliable rescue support, operating an expanded submarine fleet could be risky, especially in view of a fatal submarine accident in July 2012, when two Indonesian submariners died as a result of decompression illness during exercises in the Java Sea.


A Pinch of Sea Salt

Any fanfare about naval co-operation within ASEAN should therefore be taken with more than a pinch of sea salt. Despite its ambition to become a political-security grouping, ASEAN has made more progress on its economic and social community-building objectives. The 'trust deficit', differing priorities and interests, and unresolved territorial disputes between ASEAN members all weigh against the creation of a cohesive ASEAN security community. For example, Indonesia and Malaysia are mired in a cultural 'war' over ownership and claims of their shared heritage. Although the trust deficit usually takes a backstage in intra-ASEAN diplomacy, mistrust can surface all too easily whenever tensions arise between members.

Different priorities and interests also create a distancing gap between ASEAN navies, making it harder to co-operate on synchronizing threat perceptions and achieving common goals. This is evident in how ASEAN navies define their priorities and security interests. For instance, piracy is an utmost concern for Singapore due to its reliance on freedom and safety of navigation through the Malacca and Singapore straits. However, illegal fishing and smuggling of contraband are arguably the overriding priorities for the Indonesian and Malaysian navies due to their larger national maritime jurisdictions and considerably richer marine resources.


Consequently, the notion of inter-operability is somewhat paradoxical in a regional naval context, despite it being a mantra of co-operation, as individual states try to strictly formulate their naval policies and decisions independently from, if not against, each other. Even where Southeast Asian navies have contributed assets to counter-piracy operations off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, they have done so under separate command arrangements. In addition, ASEAN has yet to include Timor Leste as a member, despite Dili's aspirations to join and Timor Leste's geostrategic location in the regional maritime security complex. ASEAN's reluctance arises partly from Dili's inhibiting financial constraints for hosting and participating in ASEAN dialogue activities, let alone participating in regional or sub-regional maritime security co-operation. Instead, Timor Leste has sought assistance mainly from extra-regional partners, including Australia, China, Japan, Portugal, South Korea, and the United States, to build its maritime security capacity from scratch.


Sea of Contention ... and Cooperation

The South China Sea acts mainly as a constraint on naval and maritime co-operation in Southeast Asia, but also partly as a fillip for it.
Firstly, differences over threat perceptions relating to China have been at the root of increasing ASEAN disunity on security issues. Rancour between Cambodia and the Philippines at the 2012 AMM in Phnom Penh was emblematic of a deeper, emerging divide between continental and maritime states in Southeast Asia, with the former generally oriented more towards China - Vietnam being the major exception. This porous sub-regional division is likely to limit ASEAN solidarity with respect to the Southeast Asian territorial claimants in the South China Sea, and hence will also limit naval co-operation - a moot point, given that Myanmar is poised to take over ASEAN's rotating chairmanship from 2014.

Second, the four Southeast Asian claimants to disputed island territory in the South China Sea (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) are all rival claimants with China and Taiwan, but are also divided themselves in that none has recognized the sovereignty claims of the others in the region. This is due to overlaps in their claims. Malaysia and the Philippines have an additional, aggravating territorial dispute over Malaysia's eastern-most state of Sabah, on Borneo, a dispute that spilled into a violent trans-border incursion in March 2013. This further limits the potential for Southeast Asia's active claimants to agree on common positions, a shortcoming that places them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis China, which insists on dealing with individual claimants on a bilateral basis when attempting to address any territorial dispute.

Finally, illegal and unregulated fishing in the South China Sea is not only an ASEAN-China point of tension, but a trigger for intra-ASEAN tensions, for example between Vietnam and the Philippines.

The South China Sea does also have some unifying potential within ASEAN. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that littoral states around semi-enclosed seas should co-operate on natural resource conservation and environmental protection. The Gulf of Thailand littoral states have been notably successful in setting aside boundary disputes to pursue joint development. This has included Cambodia and Thailand, despite tensions that brought them to blows over disputed land border territory near the Preah Vihar temple complex. ASEAN pairings of convenience within the South China Sea proper, exemplified by Vietnam and Malaysia's joint submission on their extended continental shelf claims to the relevant UN committee in 2009, demonstrate that solidarity between Southeast Asian co-claimants is possible on an ad hoc basis.


Conclusion

Multilateral efforts to advance maritime co-operation between ASEAN members and with their partners beyond Southeast Asia remain hampered by low common denominators in threat perception, trust, and a capability mismatch between modern naval forces, like the Republic of Singapore Navy, and navies barely capable of performing constabulary duties. Further hobbled by ASEAN's own institutional weakness, multilateral naval and maritime co-operation on a region-wide level has yet to advance beyond the low-hanging fruit of confidence-building activities, such as HADR exercises, and consensus-bound dialogues such as the ASEAN Maritime Forum, where more sensitive topics like territorial disputes and crisis management of incidents at sea remain off the agenda. Counter-piracy stands out as a qualified achievement for regional maritime co-operation, but is not a strictly naval responsibility.


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~ Copyright © IHS Global Limited, 2014

FA-50 Negotiations Completed

The Philippines and South Korea completed on Friday the negotiations for the acquisition of 12 lead-in fighter trainer jets from South Korea.

The Department of National Defense Special Bids and Awards Committee 1 led by Defense Undersecretary Fernando Manalo approved the offer of the supplier, Korean Aerospace Industry (KAI), in a meeting in Camp Aguinaldo.

Manalo said the completion of the negotiations would pave the way to the signing of the contract for the P18.9-billion project.

Payment Scheme Approved

Malacañang has approved the payment scheme for the purchase of 12 lead-in fighter trainer jets from South Korea, taking the deal to acquire the air assets a step closer to completion.

The defense department has been allowed to make an advance payment of 15 percent of the total contract price to South Korean firm Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI).

The project has an approved budget of P18.9 billion and is one of the big-ticket items in the military’s upgrade program.

Malacañang has also granted the defense department’s request to tap a progress payment scheme, wherein the government will pay the supplier on a mutually-agreed upon schedule.

The approval of the payment scheme was contained in a memorandum signed by Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa Jr. on Feb. 13.

Defense Undersecretary Fernando Manalo confirmed the approval of the payment scheme for the multibillion-peso project.

The government will be spending P18.9 billion for the jets to boost the country’s territorial defense capabilities.

It will also spend P135.99 million for the basing support systems of the jets.

Under the approved scheme, the government will deliver payments upon completion of certain “milestones” or progress related to the construction of the jets.

Earlier, Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin said the delivery of the jets could start in June 2015.

Another issue that was settled was the turnaround time, the period required for the delivery of the jets’ spare parts under a two-year warranty.

It usually lasts 30 to 45 days but KAI initially wanted it prolonged it to 180 days. Both parties have agreed to 60 days.

Pact to Increase US Troops Nears

The Philippines is “very close” to completing an agreement to boost the number of U.S. troops allowed into the country at a time of growing tension over territorial disputes with China, President Benigno Aquino said.

“I haven’t been presented major sticking points, so I assume we are close to it,” Aquino, 54, said yesterday in an interview at his office in Manila. “I won’t say that we’re a day away from it, but we’re very, very close.”

Officials from the Philippines and the U.S. plan a sixth round of talks in early March, after discussions hit a snag last year on issues of access and control over facilities that may be built by the U.S. “They’re still crafting the exact language as to how to address that, but we do recognize, we do need facilities to be able to enhance ours and their abilities,” Aquino said.

The Philippines is locked in a dispute with China over territory in the resource-rich South China Sea, which has led to tit-for-tat comments in recent months even as economic ties remain strong. The tensions have spurred the Philippines to seek to expand military links with the U.S., a treaty ally, while building a further buffer by strengthening strategic ties with countries such as Japan.

Negotiators may seek to wrap up an agreement before U.S. President Barack Obama visits the Philippines in April as part of a trip to the region that also takes in Japan. The rapid U.S. response after Super Typhoon Haiyan, which struck the central Philippines in November, also showed the need for a greater troop presence, Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario said that month.

Subic Bay

The U.S. ended its permanent military presence in the Philippines with the closing of the Subic Bay base after the lease ended in 1991. The U.S. rotates 500 troops into the southern Philippines each year to aid in counter-terrorism operations, while 6,500 come annually for exercises, said Lieutenant Colonel Ramon Zagala, a spokesman for the Philippine military.

Under the current negotiations, the Philippines may give the U.S. access to bases including Subic Bay, Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin said in August.

Aquino in the interview sought to couch relations as not being “we are against China,” while calling for consistency from Beijing on its policies in the region. “Stability promotes trade and creates a bigger market for everybody, which enhances the ability to prosper,” he said.

UN Arbitration

The Philippines also needed to chart its own foreign policy without being dependent on other countries to solve its problems, he said. Manila has sought arbitration by the United Nations on the dueling claims in the South China Sea, a process China has said it does not recognize.

“This is our problem, we are primarily responsible for it,” Aquino said of the dispute. “Nobody will champion our rights if we are not able to champion our rights first.”

Aquino in an interview with the New York Times published Feb. 5 sought global support to defend territory in the South China Sea from China, drawing a parallel with the West’s failure to back Czechoslovakia against Adolf Hitler’s demands for the Sudetenland in 1938.

The official Xinhua News Agency said in a commentary response that Aquino was ignorant to compare China to Nazi Germany, while the commander of U.S. air forces in the Pacific, General Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle, said in an interview on Feb. 9 that Aquino’s comments were “not helpful.”

Air Zone

“Aquino is looked at as the point man of American foreign policy,” said Benito Lim, a political science professor at the Ateneo de Manila University. “The Philippines believes that if we take a tough stand versus China, America will support us, but clearly the U.S. is saying the China issue should be settled in a peaceful way,” Lim said today by phone.

Aquino echoed other Southeast Asian officials in warning China not to seek to replicate in the South China Sea the air defense identification zone it announced in November over territory in the East China Sea also claimed by Japan.

“That shouldn’t be a unilateral thing, it does affect so many other countries,” he said yesterday. “That doesn’t help, and hopefully the Chinese leadership also sees that.”

On Feb. 1, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei dismissed as “speculation” a report by Japanese newspaper Asahi that China also plans a South China Sea air zone.

Conduct Code

China agreed last July at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations-hosted forum in Brunei to work toward rules to avoid conflict in the waters. Still, there has not been major progress on developing a code of conduct, and China introduced fishing rules in January requiring foreign vessels to seek permission before entering waters off its southern coast.

The Philippines is awaiting the start of formal talks on the code of conduct, Aquino said. “I would like to think the collective effort is pushing the formulation of this code,” he said.

The South China Sea is also claimed in part by countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, and includes some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. Vietnam and the Philippines reject China’s map of the waters as a basis for joint development of oil and gas, a solution pushed by China.

Source: http://goo.gl/7ou3sT

What If China Did Invade Pag-asa Island?

By: Carl Thayer

In the midst of the furor over Hainan province’s new fishing regulations covering nearly sixty percent of the South China Sea, an unnamed Chinese writer penned an article in the Chinese-language publication Qianzhan (Prospects) arguing that China would recover Zhongye Island by force during 2014 as part of a long-term naval expansion plan.

The article likely would have attracted little attention outside China until a summary was translated into English by Chan Kai Yee (who is now often mistakenly listed as the original piece’s author). The summary was published by the China Daily Mail on January 13 under the headline, “China and the Philippines: The reason why a battle for Zhongye (Pag-asa) Island seems unavoidable.”

It is common for retired Chinese military officers and civilian ultranationalists to write about the South China Sea and threaten the Philippines and Vietnam with military action for “stealing” Chinese territory. The Qianzhan article cites unnamed “experts” that the People’s Liberation Army Navy has drawn up a detailed combat plan to seize Zhongye Island this year because of its strategic significance.

Zhongye is better known as Thitu Island or Pag-asa in Tagalog. It is the second largest island in the Spratlys, estimated to cover an area of 37.2 hectares (or 0.14 square miles/0.36 square kilometers). Itu Aba is the largest of the islands in the archipelago and covers an area of 46 hectares in size. It is occupied by Taiwan.

Pag-asa Island lies exposed in the upper northwest quadrant of the Spratlys at the outer boundary of islands and features forming the archipelago. To its west lies the open South China Sea.

Pag-asa Island is designated a town belonging to the Philippine municipality of Kalayaan. It boasts a civilian population of nearly two hundred. Pag-asa contains a number of structures including a municipal building, a community hall, health center, nursery school, water plant, communications tower and an airstrip.

The airstrip, known as Rancudo Airfield, is 1,400 meters in length and services both civilian and military aircraft, including the Philippine Air Force’s C-130 cargo plane. In March 2011, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Eduardo Oban announced plans to upgrade the airfield and repair army barracks. About fifty AFP soldiers are stationed on Pag-asa.

As the article noted, control over Zhongye Island would enable China to exert control over a vast expanse of the South China Sea if it constructed naval and air bases there. The author argued, “the world’s largest aircraft carrier, the [USS] Ford, costs $12.8 billion to build but only has a deck area of 0.026 square km. An air base established on Zhongye Island will be a dozen times larger and cost much less, but it is unsinkable and has a very long service life.”

How Plausible is the Qianzhan‘s Scenario?

China could easily achieve strategic surprise and seize Pag-asa Island. China could disguise an invasion force as a flotilla engaged in routine naval exercises in the South China Sea. In March-April last year, for example, China assembled a small flotilla to conduct combat training exercises in the South China Sea.

The flotilla comprised the modern amphibious assault ship Jinggangshan, two guided missile frigates and a guided missile destroyer. When the flotilla reached the waters surrounding Mischief Reef, Chinese state television showed pictures of People’s Liberation Army marines in hovercraft storming the beach of a Chinese-occupied islet supported by armed helicopters.

A similar flotilla could set sail ostensibly to undertake normal combat training exercises. It could achieve strategic surprise by veering off suddenly and invading Pag-asa. The Philippines would have little or no warning time to prepare to its defense. The island would probably be taken in a few hours or less.

This scenario assumes that U.S. intelligence and its associated national technical means failed to detect signs of China’s preparations in advance, thus providing no warning time to take action to deter China. China’s seizure of Pag-asa could be expected to follow some signs of deteriorating relations between China and the Philippines or a worsening security situation in the region. These developments might signal a change in China’s intent. This would normally trigger a closer look at Chinese naval and air activities by U.S. intelligence.

China’s seizure of Pag-asa Island would be an act of war. Currently, the Armed Forces of the Philippines would be unable to mount any meaningful response. Chinese destroyers and frigates would provide air defense if the Philippines scrambled jet fighters from the nearest air base on Palawan Island, over 480 km distant. The Philippine Navy would be woefully outgunned.

The Philippines would immediately seek consultations with the United States under their Mutual Defense Treaty to work out a response.

The political fallout from seizing Pag-asa would be a huge set back for Chinese diplomacy. ASEAN would likely adopt an uncompromising political position and demand the immediate withdrawal of Chinese forces. ASEAN would receive political backing from the international community. Chinese aggression could even be raised at the United Nation,; but China would veto any discussion by the Security Council.

China’s actions in seizing Pag-asa Island would set off a race by claimant states to beef up the defense of their islands. This would likely include increased combat air patrols, anti-shipping exercises, and the deployment of conventional submarines. Several of the larger islands could be expected to house anti-ship cruise missiles.

It is regrettable that Qianzhan’s conflict scenario, like so much commentary churned out by retired Chinese military officers and ultranationalists, does not go beyond the bravado of acclaiming a swift Chinese victory to consider the costs of such action to China’s international standing, damage to its economy, and the risks of escalating military conflict.

Many other Chinese writers and analysts argue in support of China’s peaceful rise and support President Xi Jinping’s initiative for a China-ASEAN Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation. These writers and analysts should criticize the hawkish views by retired military commentators and ultranationalist writers for being counterproductive to China’s longer-term interests.

The Philippines is to be congratulated for not rising to the bait. Official spokesmen declined to comment on an article they claimed was unofficial and unverified. Chinese media have already denied the veracity of the report.

The BRP Ramon Alcaraz 'Bushmaster' Upgrade

"THE WEAPONS ARE ALREADY HERE"

The Philippine Navy (PN) announced that installation of the two Mark 38 Model 2 25mm "Bushmaster" for the BRP Ramon Alcaraz (PF-16) is dependent on the availability of the U.S. Coast Guard armament team who will install the weapons.

The American team is expected to arrive before March, Navy officials said.

The weapons are already here and just waiting for technical team to install and calibrate the two Mark 38 Model 2 25mm automatic cannons.

The decision to seek U.S. Coast Guard aid in installing these automatic cannons came in wake of the high cost of having the guns installed by a private shipyard.

The guns were supposed to be installed before BRP Ramon Alcaraz's Nov. 22 commissioning but the cost of having it done here was just to expensive for the Navy.

PN officials hope that the weapons will be active before the end of March.

The weapon was commissioned by the U.S. Navy following the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in 2000. It was designed to counter high-speed maneuvering surface targets and will be installed in almost all U.S. surface ships by 2015.

The remotely controlled chain gun system can fire as many as 180 25m rounds per minute at targets as far as two kilometers.

Source: http://goo.gl/Q9u1jK

US to Bring the 'VERY BEST' Forces in Southeast Asia

As part of the Obama administration's rebalancing strategy, the United States will position its top armed forces capabilities in the Asia Pacific, a ranking military official said.

"American forces are working to have a 'huge impact' in the region's security. We're also gonna ensure that the forces that we have forwarded are the very best of what we could produce, that US can produce. 

We'll put our very best destroyers here, our very best ballistic missile offense here, our very best airplanes here, our very best people here. 

You'll see more US capability. But you'll also see more capability in the security of our allies as well. So this is isn't just about the United States. It's about how we collectively ensure security in this part of the world, how we build an environment for continued prosperity for our children. 

Alongside such maritime tension, the US' Asian allies including the Philippines, will also have a boost in their military strength in the coming years. We will try to provide support to them as they grow in all aspects of what an ASEAN does but security as well. We were looking at assisting in exercises, that type of thing. 

Moreover, the US will assist Southeast Asian nations in terms of their security capabilities and will be more present diplomatically, economically and socially. 

We're on the good path. You'll see us out and about more."

Admiral Samuel Locklear said this amid China's increasing assertiveness in claiming 80 percent of South China Sea, opposing exclusive economic zones of its neighbors including the Philippines.

General Herbert "Hawk" Carlisle, commander of the US Pacific Air Forces, meanwhile said that the US and the Philippines are discussing a strategy to anticipate future moves by military powers in the region such as China, North Korea and Russia.

"We have many, many of those strategy discussions within the joint force under Admiral Locklear and his family of plans that he has developed," Carlisle said.

He admitted, however, that the ongoing dialogue considers the Philippines' bilateral relationship with China in other aspects besides the territorial row.

"They have a trade with China. They have an economic relationship with China and cultural ties... It requires a lot of discussion on what we can do in peace time to better relationships," he said.

FA-50 Contract Signing by 2nd QTR

Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd. (KAI), South Korea's sole aircraft maker, expects to sign a US$450 million deal to export FA-50 light attackers to the Philippines in the first half of this year, the company head said Friday.

KAI has teamed up with the state-run Defense Acquisition Program Administration to sell 12 FA-50 aircraft to the Philippines through a government-to-government program.

While a final contract had been expected within last year after the Manila government signed a memorandum of understanding, the decision was delayed as Typhoon Haiyan swept the Southeast Asian nation in November.

"Although the schedule has been delayed due to situations (in the Philippines), we will be able to sign a contract within the first half of this year," said KAI CEO Ha Sung-yong, who is attending the Singapore Air show to promote Korean-made aircraft.

"As it is a government-to-government deal, we expect a good result, waiting for the Philippine government's final decision."

The FA-50 is a light attack variant of the T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer that was co-developed by KAI and U.S. defense firm Lockheed Martin, which was designed to replace F-5 class aircraft operated by the South Korean Air Force.

Possible Base Talks During Obama Visit

USS Enterprise in Subic

By Trefor Moss 

U.S. President Barack Obama's arrival in the Philippines this April should lend fresh impetus to faltering talks over the deployment of U.S. military forces to Subic Bay, a strategic location overlooking the disputed South China Sea.

The bilateral discussions began last August, but are understood to have stalled over the status of new "temporary" facilities, which would house visiting U.S. forces without contravening a Philippine constitutional ban on permanent foreign military bases in the country.

The latest, fifth round of talks on a proposed "framework agreement" on bilateral security ended on Jan. 31 without resolution, the U.S. Embassy in Manila said.

Manila will be the president's fourth and final stop on his coming regional tour, the White House confirmed on Feb. 12, after Japan, South Korea and Malaysia.

The slow progress of the talks with the Philippine government--an ally under the terms of a 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty--has a come as a surprise, given that the two sides share the same end goal, namely the stationing of more U.S. forces in the Philippines.

The Philippines is embroiled in an angry dispute with China over islands in the South China Sea, and wants to increase the U.S.'s involvement in its security affairs, given China's overwhelming military superiority over the Philippines' own, largely obsolete armed forces. The U.S., also with an eye on China, wants to make greater use of military bases in the Philippines as it implements a policy of "rebalancing" to the Asian-Pacific region.

The U.S. Embassy in Manila declined to comment on the substance of the continuing talks, while the Philippine Department of National Defense said it would publish details of the latest round of negotiations in due course.

However, the timing of President Obama's visit to the Philippines will prove fortuitous if it helps to resolve the impasse--or awkward, if it fails to jump-start the negotiations and produce the long-awaited deal.

"The sticking point is control," explained Ramon Casiple, executive director of the Institute of Political and Electoral Reform in Manila. "The U.S. side is insisting on complete control over [any new facilities], and the Philippines is reluctant because of constitutional reasons. It's a question of symbolism, rather than substance."

Subic Bay was formerly one of the U.S. military's most important naval stations in Asia, until the Philippines approved a new constitution in 1987 that made the stationing of foreign military forces in the country illegal. As a result, the U.S. military left Subic--and the Philippines--in 1992.

A 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement subsequently gave permission for U.S. forces to return, provided they were only "temporarily in the Philippines."

Last year, Juan Ponce Enrile, the Senate minority leader, warned that it wouldn't be so easy for U.S. forces to return.

"I don't know whether you can do that," Mr. Enrile said, when asked about the legality of letting U.S. forces back into Subic Bay, adding that it would "become an issue before the Supreme Court."

However, Manila has shown significant flexibility in its interpretation of the Visiting Forces Agreement. U.S. forces have been stationed "temporarily" in the southern Philippines for more than 12 years to assist in counterterrorism operations against Islamic militant groups linked to al Qaeda, and Mr. Casiple said that the constitutional question "should not be a showstopper," especially in light of Manila's urgent need for military assistance.

China has staged repeated shows of force in the South China Sea, most recently sending a flotilla around the Indonesian island of Java in January in a demonstration of its navy's newfound range. Indonesia's silence on the Chinese mission contrasted with the Philippines' vocal protests over what it regards as Chinese incursions into its territorial waters.

President Obama's arrival in the Philippines would be an important "show of support," he said, and would help focus the minds of the negotiators over the next two months.

"The expectation is that they will find a way," he said, by finding a formula that doesn't compromise Philippine sovereignty, such as locating any new U.S. facilities within a larger area officially controlled by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The U.S. could also offer more equipment and military assistance as further incentives, he suggested, although Washington pledged $40 million in military aid to Manila as recently as December.

The U.S. has ruled out opening new bases in the Philippines or anywhere else in the Asia-Pacific, preferring to "rotate" forces through selected host countries. In 2011, Australia agreed to host 2,500 U.S. Marines on a rotational basis, for example, while Singapore has also started to host U.S. Navy warships on similar rotational terms.

With those successful precedents in mind, U.S. negotiators will be hoping that the president can announce a newly minted deal with the Philippines when he gets here--and not be forced to negotiate it himself.

from: http://goo.gl/aToJrD

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