Waves of Expectation: Naval Cooperation in Southeast Asia

A combined US Navy and Republic of Singapore Navy task group steams together in the South China Sea in 2004, during Exercise Co-operation Afloat Readiness and Training ('CARAT'). (United States Navy)

 Despite ASEAN's claims to be a developing regional security community, there is less to naval cooperation in Southeast Asia than meets the eye. Dr Euan Graham and Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto discuss...

As tensions in the South China Sea have mounted in recent years, Southeast Asia has been viewed more as a theatre for strategic rivalry, political disunity, and competition in naval capability acquisition than as a focal point for maritime co-operation. When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN's) 10 foreign ministers (representing the member states Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) failed - for the first time in the grouping's 45-year history - to agree on a joint communiqué at the July 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Phnom Penh, the South China Sea was seen to be the issue dividing them. In particular, Cambodia had refused to support the Philippines in its territorial dispute with China.

Against this backdrop, as well as longer-running critiques of ASEAN's institutional weaknesses, it is easy to lose sight of successes in naval co-operation that have occurred across Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, instances where regional navies work with each other owe more to bilateral and localized sub-regional arrangements, like the quadripartite Malacca Straits Patrols, than they do to top-down ASEAN initiatives. This limitation fundamentally reflects the continuing primacy of state interests over supranational co-operation in the region.

Maritime Geography

Southeast Asia's prevailing geography is markedly maritime, despite the existence of land borders with India and China. The sea forms an important and integral component of the national profiles of regional states. For two of the world's largest archipelagic nations, Indonesia and the Philippines, the sea is a matter of national identity and is seen as essential to national cohesion. Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam depend heavily on the sea for economic development, while for Singapore freedom of navigation is an existential issue. Although less maritime-based, Myanmar, Cambodia, and even land-locked Laos rely on the sea for national income.

A line-up of Formidable-class frigates of the Republic of Singapore Navy. Singapore is one of a small number of Southeast Asian navies able to maintain a level of sophistication in maritime surveillance and war-fighting capability. (DCNS)

Although Timor Leste is not a member of ASEAN, it is certainly part of Southeast Asia's maritime security complex. The cone-shaped geography of Timor Leste flanks two important maritime areas: the Ombai-Wetar Strait to the north; and the energy-rich Timor Sea to the south. Compounding this is Southeast Asia's central location and connecting function in the wider Indo-Pacific macro region, including the choke-point straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok-Makassar, and Ombai-Wetar as well as the semi-enclosed South China Sea itself. As trade and other interactions within the Indo-Pacific region grow, the importance of Southeast Asia as a maritime crossroads will naturally increase. In this context, the maritime domain will be strategically predominant. 

Accordingly, Southeast Asia's security environment is notable for the large number of transnational issues that demand co-operation and collective action across borders and boundaries. Many of these issues have a maritime or riverine dimension, such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.


Patrols and Exercises

Members of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency's (MMEA's) Special Task and Rescue team carry out a boarding exercise. Malaysia has handed over responsibility for law enforcement within its 12 n mile territorial sea and 200 n mile Exclusive Economic Zone to the MMEA. (Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency)

Coordinated patrols and combined exercises are the predominant type of naval co-operation in Southeast Asia, of which the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) is the most important example. Started in 2005, the MSP was initially a three-way initiative to co-ordinate counter-piracy patrols between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, whose territorial waters overlap across large sections of the Malacca and Singapore Straits. As well as 'grey-hulled' naval vessels, 'white-hulled' non-military vessels participate: Malaysia for example has largely handed over responsibility for law enforcement, including counter-piracy, within its 12 n mile territorial sea and 200 n mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency. Coordinated patrols are different from combined patrols, however. The 'coordinated' arrangement assuages concerns over breaches of sovereignty as patrolling vessels are allowed only to operate within their national maritime boundaries, save for the aerial 'eyes in the sky' component which admitted Thailand as the fourth participant in 2008. The MSP concept has played a part in reducing piracy incidents in the straits from their last serious spike in 2004, when 38 actual or attempted attacks took place, compared with 13 occurrences in 2012, none of which fell into the most serious categories.

However, political limitations have constrained the operational effectiveness of the MSP, since hot pursuit arrangements are only partially in place. In reality, and true to the adage that piracy is best tackled on land, the coordinated patrols have been effective mainly in the indirect sense of providing a deterrent presence. Cases of pirates and robbers being apprehended red-handed during actual patrols are exceedingly rare.

It can be argued that the success story of the MSP owes its existence indirectly to the surge in interest in maritime security in the Malacca Straits expressed by outside powers around 2004. Without such external pressure, fed by the perception that the United States was contemplating taking a hands-on role in securing the straits, it is doubtful whether Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore would have co-operated in the manner that they did. Indonesia and Malaysia have long espoused that the littoral states should have exclusive responsibility for security for the portion of the straits that falls within their territorial waters - notwithstanding the international transit passage regime and traffic separation schemes that regulate shipping passing through.

Beyond the MSP, coordinated patrols such as the Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrol, Malaysia-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (Patkor Malindo), and the Malaysia-Philippines maritime patrols are conducted bilaterally along common maritime boundaries. In the Gulf of Tonkin, Vietnam and China have conducted naval patrols together since 2005, a notable success juxtaposed against the tensions and incidents that have marred their relations in the South China Sea proper. These patrols, conducted twice a year, are combined, multinational activities to the extent that warships may venture up to 5 km either side of the maritime boundary. However, such co-operation is made possible only by the existence of an agreed maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin. Elsewhere in the region overlapping maritime boundaries and territorial disputes continue to constrain naval co-operation, and not just in the South China Sea.

Vietnam has also been notably active in pushing forward direct communication links and coordinated patrol initiatives with several ASEAN partners, including Malaysia and Cambodia. More recently, Vietnam has built two-way communications links with Brunei, and prospectively Indonesia is next on the list. This kind of organic bilateral - or 'cross-bracing' - engagement among Southeast Asian nations may be more sustainable than the ASEAN-led top-down approach.

Alongside coordinated patrols are combined, multinational exercises established to improve professionalism, inter-operability, and co-operation as well as to develop exchange experience and draw lessons from fellow navies. These exercises include the Indonesia-Singapore 'MINEX' mine countermeasures activity, conducted since 1997; the Malaysia-Singapore 'Malapura' exercise, established in 1984; and the Malaysia-Thailand 'Thalay Laut' bilateral naval exercise.

Malaysian ship KD Jebat (front) and Indonesian ship KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda anchored in Jervis Bay, Australia during the first ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)-Plus maritime security exercise in October 2013. The exercise, intended to promote information sharing and communication at sea, involved force elements from Australia, Brunei, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. (Royal Australian Navy)

Information Sharing and Dialogue

Maritime information sharing and naval dialogues constitute a second type of regional naval co-operation. Information sharing can act as a force multiplier for regional navies, as well as for maritime law enforcement agencies, to enable them to respond individually or collectively to maritime security challenges.

A specific example of the benefits of information sharing is the Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP), launched in 2006. Its membership includes eight ASEAN members - with Indonesia and Malaysia not participating. The latter's refusal to participate in particular leaves a huge hole in regional maritime co-operation. Apart from covering much of Southeast Asia's maritime water-frontage, including the strategically important Malacca Strait, the involvement of both Indonesia and Malaysia is essential if continuing maritime security risks - as highlighted by a recent resurgence of incidents including petty theft and illegal fuel transfers in ports and anchorages - are to be addressed. Although there is some working-level collaboration between ReCAAP and Indonesia and Malaysia, their full participation would increase the effectiveness of ReCAAP's Singapore-hosted Information Sharing Centre, which operates on a 24/7 basis through a secure web-based information network system that links all ReCAAP national 'Focal Points' - the agency in each ReCAAP member state which acts as the primary point of contact with ReCAAP - to enable appropriate responses to incidents of maritime crime.

The Information Fusion Centre (IFC), located at Singapore's Changi Naval Base command-and-control centre, works on a similar arrangement but is more naval-centric. It brings together naval liaison officers from around 20 countries, including fellow ASEAN members. Set up in 2009, it represents a significant investment in regional co-ordination capacity. The direct link back to national headquarters brought by the resident liaison officers is an important part of its operational concept. Its 24-hour manning approach also gives it obvious potential to serve as a hub for maritime crisis response.

Linked to the IFC is the ASEAN Information-sharing Portal which facilitates real-time information exchange between various operational centres within ASEAN navies through a 'group chat' function. Coordinated by the Singaporean and Indonesian navies, the portal can be accessed through a personal computer at fixed operation centres, or via the mobile devices and smart phones of individual officers.

However, information sharing has its limits. Even sharing data on the common threat posed by piracy and armed robbery at sea can be problematic, given a culture-bound reluctance to share national datasets of incidents occurring within territorial waters, and the tendency to equate information with intelligence. Moreover, there are lingering concerns about the potential for leakage and misuse of sensitive information on vessel and cargo movements, particularly at local law enforcement levels. Formal mechanisms for information exchange, such as the Malacca Straits Patrols Information System, may be less reliable in practice than informal channels, which in turn are dependent on the strength of inter-personal connections, hence prone to dislocation when key personnel rotate elsewhere.


Capability Pooling

Notwithstanding such geopolitical concerns, ASEAN navies have aimed to test the limits of co-operation in previously unplumbed depths. Several Southeast Asian navies have recently entered into a limited form of capability-pooling in submarine search-and-rescue (SAR), arising out of concerns over the safety of submarine operations. IHS Jane's Navy International has projected that Southeast Asia is a growing submarine market, with 13 diesel-electric boats (SSKs) to be acquired between 2011 and 2020 at an estimated cost of USD4.7 billion.

Singapore recently signed a contract with ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems GmBH to acquire two new Type 218SG submarines, equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP), for delivery from 2020. The deal includes a training and logistics package, and also a combat system to be developed jointly with Singapore's ST Electronics. Acquired to replace the Challenger class, the Type 218SGs are Singapore's first new, custom-built submarines and will serve alongside the AIP-capable ex-Swedish Västergötland Archer-class boats.
More submarines also mean a higher chance of accidents, especially when they are deployed in the confined and narrow waters of Southeast Asia by navies with limited operational experience in such demanding environments.

A Type 209 Chang Bogo conventional submarine. In December 2012, Indonesia announced it would purchase three Chang Bogo boats from South Korea. (Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft)

Currently, Singapore has the region's only submarine rescue capability. Launched in 2008, the Submarine Support and Rescue Vessel, MV Swift Rescue , is designed to carry out rescue operations for distressed submarines in up to sea state 5. Swift Rescue embarks a Submarine Rescue Vehicle (SRV) that it transports to the location of the submarine and deploys to extract survivors. The SRV will then transport the rescued submariners to a Transfer Lock and Recompression Chamber for any medical treatment required. This was a clear opportunity for some level of capability pooling, given that the other ASEAN navies operating submarines - Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam - face three unpalatable alternatives: bearing the risk of continuing to operate submarines without SAR; acquiring their own submarine SAR vessels - which would be an expensive exercise in duplication, given the small numbers of platforms involved; or relying on extra-regional states that might not be able to respond as required in an emergency. Instead, Indonesia and Vietnam have opted to enter into bilateral agreements with Singapore, in 2012 and 2013 respectively, to extend submarine SAR coverage to them.


As Southeast Asia's longest continuous submarine operator, it is surprising that Indonesia lacks a submarine rescue capability. Jakarta plans to acquire up to 12 boats over the next two decades to replace and augment its submarine force, currently constructed around two Chakra-class Type 209 boats acquired from Germany in the 1980s. In December 2012, Indonesia announced it would purchase three Type 209 Chang Bogo submarines from South Korea for a cheaper price, despite initially preferring the more costly Russian Kilo or Amur classes. The latter types were re-offered by Moscow in August 2013, but their reported procurement cost of around USD5 billion fell beyond Jakarta's naval budget.

Considering its limited financial means, Jakarta's ambitious submarine plans appear genuine, as a submarine base is already under construction in the city of Palu on Sulawesi Island. Critically, Indonesia has also managed to preserve a functioning submarine arm to serve as a nucleus from which to expand. However, without reliable rescue support, operating an expanded submarine fleet could be risky, especially in view of a fatal submarine accident in July 2012, when two Indonesian submariners died as a result of decompression illness during exercises in the Java Sea.


A Pinch of Sea Salt

Any fanfare about naval co-operation within ASEAN should therefore be taken with more than a pinch of sea salt. Despite its ambition to become a political-security grouping, ASEAN has made more progress on its economic and social community-building objectives. The 'trust deficit', differing priorities and interests, and unresolved territorial disputes between ASEAN members all weigh against the creation of a cohesive ASEAN security community. For example, Indonesia and Malaysia are mired in a cultural 'war' over ownership and claims of their shared heritage. Although the trust deficit usually takes a backstage in intra-ASEAN diplomacy, mistrust can surface all too easily whenever tensions arise between members.

Different priorities and interests also create a distancing gap between ASEAN navies, making it harder to co-operate on synchronizing threat perceptions and achieving common goals. This is evident in how ASEAN navies define their priorities and security interests. For instance, piracy is an utmost concern for Singapore due to its reliance on freedom and safety of navigation through the Malacca and Singapore straits. However, illegal fishing and smuggling of contraband are arguably the overriding priorities for the Indonesian and Malaysian navies due to their larger national maritime jurisdictions and considerably richer marine resources.


Consequently, the notion of inter-operability is somewhat paradoxical in a regional naval context, despite it being a mantra of co-operation, as individual states try to strictly formulate their naval policies and decisions independently from, if not against, each other. Even where Southeast Asian navies have contributed assets to counter-piracy operations off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, they have done so under separate command arrangements. In addition, ASEAN has yet to include Timor Leste as a member, despite Dili's aspirations to join and Timor Leste's geostrategic location in the regional maritime security complex. ASEAN's reluctance arises partly from Dili's inhibiting financial constraints for hosting and participating in ASEAN dialogue activities, let alone participating in regional or sub-regional maritime security co-operation. Instead, Timor Leste has sought assistance mainly from extra-regional partners, including Australia, China, Japan, Portugal, South Korea, and the United States, to build its maritime security capacity from scratch.


Sea of Contention ... and Cooperation

The South China Sea acts mainly as a constraint on naval and maritime co-operation in Southeast Asia, but also partly as a fillip for it.
Firstly, differences over threat perceptions relating to China have been at the root of increasing ASEAN disunity on security issues. Rancour between Cambodia and the Philippines at the 2012 AMM in Phnom Penh was emblematic of a deeper, emerging divide between continental and maritime states in Southeast Asia, with the former generally oriented more towards China - Vietnam being the major exception. This porous sub-regional division is likely to limit ASEAN solidarity with respect to the Southeast Asian territorial claimants in the South China Sea, and hence will also limit naval co-operation - a moot point, given that Myanmar is poised to take over ASEAN's rotating chairmanship from 2014.

Second, the four Southeast Asian claimants to disputed island territory in the South China Sea (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) are all rival claimants with China and Taiwan, but are also divided themselves in that none has recognized the sovereignty claims of the others in the region. This is due to overlaps in their claims. Malaysia and the Philippines have an additional, aggravating territorial dispute over Malaysia's eastern-most state of Sabah, on Borneo, a dispute that spilled into a violent trans-border incursion in March 2013. This further limits the potential for Southeast Asia's active claimants to agree on common positions, a shortcoming that places them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis China, which insists on dealing with individual claimants on a bilateral basis when attempting to address any territorial dispute.

Finally, illegal and unregulated fishing in the South China Sea is not only an ASEAN-China point of tension, but a trigger for intra-ASEAN tensions, for example between Vietnam and the Philippines.

The South China Sea does also have some unifying potential within ASEAN. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that littoral states around semi-enclosed seas should co-operate on natural resource conservation and environmental protection. The Gulf of Thailand littoral states have been notably successful in setting aside boundary disputes to pursue joint development. This has included Cambodia and Thailand, despite tensions that brought them to blows over disputed land border territory near the Preah Vihar temple complex. ASEAN pairings of convenience within the South China Sea proper, exemplified by Vietnam and Malaysia's joint submission on their extended continental shelf claims to the relevant UN committee in 2009, demonstrate that solidarity between Southeast Asian co-claimants is possible on an ad hoc basis.


Conclusion

Multilateral efforts to advance maritime co-operation between ASEAN members and with their partners beyond Southeast Asia remain hampered by low common denominators in threat perception, trust, and a capability mismatch between modern naval forces, like the Republic of Singapore Navy, and navies barely capable of performing constabulary duties. Further hobbled by ASEAN's own institutional weakness, multilateral naval and maritime co-operation on a region-wide level has yet to advance beyond the low-hanging fruit of confidence-building activities, such as HADR exercises, and consensus-bound dialogues such as the ASEAN Maritime Forum, where more sensitive topics like territorial disputes and crisis management of incidents at sea remain off the agenda. Counter-piracy stands out as a qualified achievement for regional maritime co-operation, but is not a strictly naval responsibility.


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